Measurement and public policy uses of subjective well-being by Hoorn, A.A.J. van
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/74894
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
NiCE Working Paper 09-110 
May 2009
Measurement and Public Policy 
Uses of Subjective Well-Being
André van Hoorn
Nijmegen Center for Economics (NiCE) 
Institute for Management Research 
Radboud University Nijmegen
P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
http://www.ru.nl/nice/workingpapers
Abstract
Over the centuries happiness, or more broadly, well-being has been subject o f unremitting 
debate. Recently, measures of so-called subjective well-being (SWB; e.g. self-reported 
happiness) have gained prominence and are receiving increasing attention from scientists, 
policy makers and the public alike. A consensus appears to be emerging that people’s self­
assessment of how well life is going can convey important information, in particular on 
underlying emotional states. This paper introduces measures of SWB, examining whether the 
measures are meaningful and valid, and exploring a possible role in shaping and appraising 
public policy. The first part elaborates what SWB means and discusses some of the indicators 
used to measure the construct. Special attention is paid to the quality of different SWB 
measures, i.e. their reliability and validity. SWB appears to be largely defined through the 
specific indicators used to measure it but that is not to say that these measures are not 
capturing something important. In the second part, several possible uses of SWB in the 
making o f policy are discerned: (1) SWB as an explicit policy target; (2) SWB as a 
complement to existing measures of well-being; (3) SWB as a measuring rod in cost-benefit 
analyses; and (4) the use of SWB in the construction of poverty statistics and equivalence 
scales. The broad conclusion that emerges is that SWB indeed can help shape and appraise 
public policy. This holds despite the fact that SWB research still has important gaps. W hat is 
more, future research promises to secure further the usefulness of SWB research in policy 
applications, not least as improvements in measurement take hold.
André van Hoom, Radboud University Nijmegen, Department o f Economics, Tel: +31 243 
612 344, Fax: +31 243 612 379, E-mail: A.vanHoorn@fm.ru.nl. This work was written while 
the author was a trainee at the Statistics Directorate o f the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development. Helpful comments by Jon Hall, Anat Itay and Ramzi Mabsout 
are gratefully acknowledged. O f course, the views expressed in this paper are the author’s 
only.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Measures of subjective well-being (commonly abbreviated as SWB) or, in more popular 
terms, happiness, are a contemporary contribution to an age-old debate. Interest in happiness 
and its pursuit, or more generally what makes for a good life, started at least two millennia 
ago with Aristotle (384-322 BC) and, later, Epicurus (341-270 BC). Others, including 
Thomas Aquinas, David Hume and Jeremy Bentham continued and added to the debate. The 
consensus was that happiness matters. In fact, many went so far as to claim that, ultimately, 
happiness is all that matters.1 However, massive conceptual difficulties suggest a less strong 
conclusion: maximising the experience of happiness, and related notions like flourishing, joy 
or pleasure, whilst minimising painful episodes, is the quintessential motive underlying 
human behaviour.2
Given the widespread recognition o f the importance of happiness, the study of SWB 
has a surprisingly short history (cf. Kahneman et al., 1999; Sirgy et al., 2006). Systematic 
research of SWB, in particular into its correlates and causes, did not start until the second part 
o f the 20th century (Fellows, 1966 and Wilson, 1967 present early overviews).3 The literature 
has bourgeoned since then though. First, psychologists and other social scientists have taken 
huge steps in their understanding of the factors influencing people’s SWB.4 Second, the 
measurement of SWB has drastically improved, which it is expected to continue to do with 
the spreading use of advances in information- and communication technology. In important 
ways, then, SWB research has proven itself a serious contender in the wider discipline of
1 Short, but more elaborate accounts of the history of the happiness debate can be found in 
McMahon (2004). Angner (2005) provides a more thorough overview of philosophical issues 
related to the concept of happiness or, more generally, well-being. King and N apa (1998) 
present evidence that people indeed attach great value to happiness (see also Diener et al., 
1998 and Diener and Oishi, 2004).
2 For some common philosophical conceptualizations o f happiness and well-being, see 
Blackburn (1996) and Walsh (2005).
3 SWB, our preferred term for reasons detailed below, is actually a broader notion than just 
happiness (see, for example, Diener, 2006). Happiness, however, is the more familiar, and 
certainly catchier, term often used to refer to the whole construct of SWB.
4 Diener (1984, 1994), Diener et al. (1999), Easterlin (2003), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Nettle 
(2005) and Layard (2005) provide overviews of this literature.
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social science, capable of providing valuable information on an essential aspect of people’s 
lives and societies as a whole. As such, it solicits increasing attention of politicians, 
government officials and the public alike.
This paper introduces measures of SWB and explores their applications in policy 
making. Specific attention is paid to the question whether indicators of SWB are meaningful 
in the sense that they provide important and useful information on how well people or 
societies as a whole are doing, and how this information can subsequently be used to shape 
and appraise public policy. The organisation of the paper is simple. It starts by elaborating 
what is meant by the term SWB in Section 2. Section 3 subsequently discusses some actual 
indicators of SWB and Section 4 looks at the reliability and validity of SWB measures. some 
public policy uses of SWB are considered in Section 5 and to conclude Section 6 gives some 
final and summarizing thoughts.
2. WHAT IS SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING?
A consensus has gradually emerged mainly from the psychological literature around a 
working definition o f SWB. W e can define SWB as ‘people’s positive evaluations of their 
lives’, which, in turn, ‘includes positive emotion, engagement, satisfaction, and meaning’ 
(Diener and Seligman, 2004: p. 1). As this section shows, however, the concept is somewhat 
more complicated than that, but the essential feature of SWB is, of course, that it is not an 
objective measure:
Notably absent from  definitions o f  SWB are necessary objective conditions such as 
health, comfort, virtue, or wealth. Although such conditions are seen as potential 
influences on SWB, they are not seen as an inherent and necessary part o f  it. (Diener, 
1984: pp. 543-544).
Two additional hallmarks of SWB, next to its subjectivity, are that:
1. a positive rating requires not only positive experiences but also the absence o f negative 
ones; and
2. reported scores include a global assessment of how well people think (feel) their life is 
going and is not limited to one or more domains or specific periods (Diener, 1994: p. 106; 
see also Diener, 1984).
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Looking at the latter two features of SWB in more detail, we see that they suggest that 
subjective well-being is actually an umbrella term, comprising different elements of people’s 
lives. The SWB literature has broken down people’s judgements of their lives along the lines 
indicated above and into two distinctive components (cf. Andrews and Withey, 1976: p. 18; 
Veenhoven, 1984: p. 25). The first component is the affective part of overall SWB and refers 
to both the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect. This part is an 
evaluation guided by emotions and feelings. A cognitive part constitutes the second 
component. It is a conscious, information-based appraisal o f one’s life for which people 
judge the extent to which their life so far measures up to their expectations and resembles 
their envisioned ‘ideal’ life.
Researchers in the field often make a distinction between happiness and life 
satisfaction. Happiness is sometimes used to denote the affective part o f SWB (which in turn 
must be decomposed in positive affect and negative affect), and life satisfaction as the 
cognitive part.5 This labelling is not universal, however, and people commonly use happiness 
and life satisfaction synonymously with SWB. W hile often clear from the particular context, 
the ambiguous use of terminology— happiness, life satisfaction and SWB— does reveal that 
the field does not yet agree on anyone definition for its over-arching subject matter. 
Subjective well-being, however, is a rather more accurate description of the broader field 
under discussion here and, accordingly, this paper uses the term SWB throughout, noting that 
it is an umbrella term that includes both satisfaction and happiness, however defined (cf. 
Diener, 2006; see also note 3).
Underlying the definition of SWB as a personal evaluation of one’s life is the idea 
that it is not uncommon for people to make such affective and cognitive judgments (Diener, 
1994: pp. 106-107). Stated differently, people continuously evaluate their life and aspects of 
it, judging which elements are valuable and desirable and which are not. The affective and 
the cognitive component of SWB subsequently share a common core but differ in important 
respects as well. ‘Life satisfaction and hedonic level are likely to correlate because both are 
influenced by appraisals of one’s life events, and activities, and circumstances’ Diener (1994: 
p. 107) notes, but ‘at the same time, life satisfaction and hedonic level are likely to diverge
5 See, for instance, the discussion in Lyubomirsky et al. (2005: pp. 820-822). This association 
is likely to have its root in the hedonic conceptualisation of happiness as pleasure and the 
absence of pain that can be found in the work of Jeremy Bentham but is also common in the 
SWB literature (e.g. Kahneman, 1999 and Layard, 2005).
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because life satisfaction is a global summary of one’s life as a whole, whereas hedonic level 
consists of ongoing reactions to events (and may also be influenced by unconscious goals and 
biological factors which may influence mood)’.
Recent work by Kahneman and Krueger (2006: p. 14) confirms this view. They find 
that net (positive minus negative) affect and reported life satisfaction are indeed positively 
correlated, but differ in the factors influencing them. Income, education and marital status are 
better predictors of life satisfaction than of affect, for instance. Likewise, data on daily 
activities, e.g. commuting, watching TV and cooking, seem to matter more for net affect (see 
also Campbell et al., 1976).
But measures o f SWB need not refer to life as a whole. Rather, one can investigate 
separately whether someone is happy or satisfied with different domains of life, such as work, 
family life, financial situation or health. One would expect that someone who is satisfied with 
all relevant aspects of his or her life, will judge life as a whole favourable as well. For 
example, Andrews and Withey (1976: p. 127) find that satisfaction with family, money, 
amount of fun, housing, national government and so-called self-efficacy makes up half of all 
the variance in reported life satisfaction. The exact relation between domain satisfaction and 
global satisfaction is unknown, however. That is, it is not clear whether people evaluate their 
life by looking at specific aspects (the bottom-up approach) or whether the global judgment 
trickles down to lower-level appraisals (top-down) (Veenhoven, 1996: p. 23 and 1997: pp. 
19-20; see also Sirgy et al., 2006: p. 426). Diener and Seligman (2004: p. 12) review 
evidence of lower-level satisfaction spilling over to higher-level satisfaction, but also 
between domains, i.e. job  satisfaction spills over to marital satisfaction.
To return to the definition of SWB, it is clear that, as mentioned, the field lacks a 
single, comprehensive definition. Diener et al. (1999: p. 277) find that ‘subjective well-being 
is a broad category of phenomena that includes people’s emotional responses, domain 
satisfactions, and global judgements o f life satisfaction’ (cf. Diener and Seligman, 2004: p. 
1). This is not a universal definition but rather a description of what SWB comprises. The 
absence of a clear-cut definition reflects that, as a concept, SWB has no precise theoretical 
basis. Indeed, the field appears largely driven by empirical work, and SWB is conceptualised 
through the specific indicators used, i.e. by the specific questions asked. The next section 
elaborates the measurement of SWB.
3. MEASURING SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
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3.1 Single-item scales
Since the first systematic analyses of SWB some five decades ago, a large number of SWB 
measures have been developed. The most widespread of these are also the most 
straightforward. Questionnaires simply ask people to state how happy or satisfied they are 
(with their life as a whole). Two well-known examples of such single-item questions, used in 
the famous W orld Values Survey (European Values Study Group and W orld Values Survey 
Association, 2006), are:
Taking all things together, would you say you are
1 -  ‘Very happy’
2 -  ‘Quite happy ’
3 -  ‘N ot very happy ’
4 -  ‘N ot at all happy ’
and
A ll things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dissatisfied Satisfied
Other single-item questions exist, but the basic method of measuring SWB is captured by 
these questions. To address specific issues, such as satisfaction with a domain, the standard 
approach can be adapted to ask, for instance, ‘Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you 
with your job / home life / financial situation?’
3.2 Multi-item scales
Since SWB ‘is a broad category of phenomena’ (cf. Diener et al., 1999: p. 277), one should 
not expect single-item questions to be able to provide an all-encompassing indicator of 
people’s evaluation of their lives. Indeed, it would be infeasible to have a single-item
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measure capture separately the cognitive and the affective part of SWB, especially when one 
considers that the latter, in turn, consists of both the absence of negative affect) and the 
presence of positive affect. In much the same fashion, a multi-item scale can focus on a 
particular part of SWB, for instance the cognitive part, but its results are normally considered 
more reliable than those of single-item measures (see also Section 4 on reliability and 
validity). Accordingly, a broad array of measures exists (see, for example, Veenhoven, 1996: 
pp. 3-4). Here we discuss two often-used scales, though many more exist, each with their 
own strengths and weaknesses.
3.2.1 Positive and Negative A ffect Schedule (PANAS) Scales
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scales (Watson et al., 1988) are 
designed specifically to measure positive and negative emotions. The PANAS can easily be 
tailored to include less or more feelings or be broader or narrower in its cover of time periods. 
It asks about the experience of certain emotional states:
This scale consists o f  a number o f  words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Indicate to what extent [you fe l t  this way during the past week]. Use the following  
scale to record your answers:
1 -  Very slightly or not at all
2 -  A  little
3 -  M oderately
4 -  Quite a bit
5 -  Extremely
_____ Interested
_____ Distressed
_____ Excited
_____ Upset
_____ Strong
_____ Guilty
[Et cetera]
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The overall rating is obtained by aggregating the answers to the different states.
3.2.2 Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS)
The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985; see also Pavot and Diener, 
1993a) is an example of a multi-item measure o f SWB that limits attention to a specific 
aspect of SWB, in this case life satisfaction. The questionnaire for this scale reads as follows:
Below are five  statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 to 7 scale 
below indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on 
the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1 -  Strongly disagree
2 -  Disagree
3 -  Slightly disagree
4 -  Neither agree nor disagree
5 -  Slightly agree
6 -  Agree
7 -  Strongly agree
In most ways my life is close to my ideal 
The conditions o f  my life are excellent
I  am satisfied with my life
So fa r  I  have gotten the important things I  want in life 
I f  I  could live my life over, I  would change almost nothing
The answers to these five questions are summed to obtain an overall rating:
5 -  9 Extremely dissatisfied
15 -  19
10 -  14 Dissatisfied  
Slightly dissatisfied
20 Neutral
26 -  30
21 -  25 Slightly satisfied 
Satisfied
8
31 -  35 Extremely satisfied
The construct measured by the SWLS closely resembles the one underlying the single-item 
life satisfaction question discussed above. The difference is that the SWLS provides a more 
reliable measure o f life satisfaction (see Section 4), but is obviously more costly to collect 
both in terms of administration costs and respondent burden.
3.3 More advanced measures
This subsection discusses two other approaches to quantifying SWB that are increasingly 
used. The first is the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) or Ecological Momentary 
Assessment (EMA) (Scollon et al., 2003 and Stone et al., 1999 provide overviews), and the 
second, the Day Reconstruction M ethod (DRM), a technique recently developed by Daniel 
Kahneman and colleagues (Kahneman et al., 2004a, 2004b).
3.3.1 Experience Sampling M ethod (ESM) or Ecological M omentary Assessment (EMA) 
ESM is a method to obtain self-appraisals. Individuals are asked repeatedly, often over 
random intervals and for a prolonged period, to make a certain assessment, which can range 
from filling in questionnaires like the ones just discussed, but can also involve physiological 
tests (e.g. blood pressure levels, heart rates). The essential features o f ESM are that the 
questions and evaluations are made frequently, about the time period that has just elapsed and 
in respondents’ day-to-day surroundings. It is, in fact, these qualities that drove ESM ’s 
development in the first place. As Stone et al. (1999: pp. 27-28) point out: (i) studying 
individuals in their typical surroundings reduces ecological distortions (i.e. has high 
ecological validity);6 (ii) on the spot evaluation avoids retrospective distortion; and (iii) high- 
frequency assessment allows more detailed study of developments over time and the role of 
changes in circumstances.
Scollon et al. (2003: p. 7) describe three types of experience sampling:
1. Interval-contingent sampling: subjects complete self-reports after a designated interval 
and for a stipulated amount of time (e.g. one report every other hour);
6 Famous is the phenomenon known as ‘white-coat hypertension’ in which respondents’ 
blood pressure levels are elevated when measured by medical personnel but not when 
measured at home by themselves (Stone et al., 1999: pp. 27-28).
9
2. Event-contingent sampling: subjects file self-reports when a pre-specified event takes 
place or has taken place (e.g. a report after every social encounter); and
3. Signal-contingent sampling: subjects give their self-reports when prompted by a 
randomly-timed signal— this is the form of sampling that is typically labelled ESM.
ESM and EMA are often equated (Scollon et al., 2003: p. 7). But Stone et al. (1999) 
distinguish ESM from ecological momentary assessment (EMA) on the grounds that EMA 
also collects information about environmental circumstances while the former is only 
interested in respondents’ self-evaluation.
ESM can be undertaken in several ways. For the self-appraisal any scale or measure 
o f SWB will do; simply choose the one that best captures the phenomen(on)(a) of interest. 
The actual sampling can also be organised in many different manners (Scollon et al., 2003: p. 
6). In the early days of ESM, subjects were often responsible for keeping track of intervals 
between questionnaires, for example. As technology advanced, electronic watches pre­
programmed to beep at random intervals provided the necessary cues. Nowadays palmtops 
are increasingly used, and these come with important advantages. Automated questionnaires 
are readily available and completed reports can be analysed instantly.
Unsurprisingly, the benefits offered by ESM and EMA in terms o f coverage, 
ecological validity and reliability come at a cost. Using these methods and obtaining regular, 
virtually online self-assessments is much more expensive than the use of, say, one-time 
questionnaires, and the final choice of survey instrument requires careful consideration.7
3.3.2 Day Reconstruction M ethod (DRM)
The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) is another specific approach to collect reported 
SWB. It shares many of the advantages o f the other methods, but appears easier to 
implement. The technique requires respondents to report about the preceding day and 
evaluate its various episodes (e.g. hours). Kahneman et al. (2004a) first applied his technique 
and their questionnaire is along these lines:
How did you fee l during this episode?
7According to Stone et al. (1999: p. 30) ESM or EMA is particularly appropriate to measure 
pain and symptoms of patients.
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Please rate each feeling on the scale given. A  rating o f  0 means that you did not 
experience that feeling at all. A  rating o f  6 means that this feeling was a very 
important part o f  the experience.
• Happy
• Frustrated/annoyed
• Depressed/blue 
[Et cetera]
0, N ot at all -  6, Very much 
0, N ot at all -  6, Very much
0, N ot at all -  6, Very much
Again, however, the method leaves open the use of different measures of SWB.
3.4 Discussion
The review above shows there are many approaches to the measurement o f SWB, each with 
their own benefits and drawbacks. The different approaches also share an important 
commonality: whatever question, none entails ‘happiness’ or ‘satisfaction’ in a well-defined 
form. Measures of SWB simply depict how people evaluate their lives or aspects thereof in 
response to questions asking them, for instance, how happy or satisfied they are. The 
existence of various approaches to measuring SWB indicates that the field has not solved the 
elusive question of what is happiness (nor does it generally claim to have done so). It merely 
contributes to the age-old research programme on the good life and human betterment by 
analysing empirical constructs SWB researchers feel have important bearing on this issue. 
Accordingly, and as alluded to in the previous section, the field is characterised by 
‘measurement before or without theory’ to paraphrase a long-standing discussion in 
economics.8 An important question is whether reported happiness or life satisfaction scores 
are meaningful. The paper turns to this question next.
4. ARE SWB MEASURES MEANINGFUL?
For SWB measures to be meaningful they should be valid (that is they should capture the 
phenomenon of interest that they purport to measure) and reliable (that is they should
8 See, for instance, Prescott (1986) and especially Koopmans (1947).
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measure it accurately). A good deal of work has been done by SWB researchers to investigate 
this.9
4.1 Reliability
The reliability of an indicator can be defined as its overall quality, i.e. its consistency and its 
ability to give the same results in repeated measurement. One good measure of an indicator’s 
reliability is its test-retest correlation (Larsen and Fredrickson, 1999: p. 43).10 That is, the 
level of similarity obtained by making the same measurement twice, separated by some time 
period. It is well known that minor differences in circumstances and technical features of the 
specific questionnaire used can affect the reported level of SWB however defined (see 
Schwarz and Strack, 1999: p. 62). Correspondingly, the test-retest correlation for most single­
item measures typically does not exceed 0.60 when the same question is asked twice during 
the same one-hour interview (ibidem; see also Andrews and Withey, 1976). Kahneman and 
Krueger (2006: p. 7) found a test-retest correlation of 0.59 in a sample o f 218 respondents 
interviewed and re-interviewed two weeks apart. Veenhoven (1996: p. 6) discusses the effect 
of the lag between times of asking on test-retest correlation: if  respondents are asked twice in 
the same interview correlations are approximately 0.70; if  the lag spans a week test-retest 
correlation drops to about 0.60. He points out, however, that people seldom make large 
moves, e.g. from ‘satisfied’ to ‘dissatisfied’. Finally, a detailed study by Ehrhardt et al.
(2000) examines panel data for Germany for the period 1984-1994. They find that at the start 
o f the sample period the year-to-year correlation was 0.45 but that, for unknown reasons, it 
gradually increased to 0.54. At the same time, however, the correlation between SWB 
reported in 1984 and that reported in 1994 was only 0.29. This suggests that the measure is 
reliable but is susceptible to change as well, for instance in response to changes in objective 
circumstances.
9 For surveys of much of the validation exercises, see, amongst others, Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2004), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), Diener (1984, 1994), Diener et al. (1999), 
Diener and Suh (1999), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Nettle 
(2005) and Layard (2005).
10 In case of multi-item measures (see discussion below), reliability can be assessed further 
by looking at the internal consistency or homogeneity of the specific measures, that is, by 
analysing the extent to which the different items of the scale indeed measure the same 
underlying construct (Larsen and Fredrickson, 1999: p. 43).
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In general, the reliability of SWB measures as evidenced by test-retest correlation is 
substantially lower than that found for common microeconomic variables such as personal 
income (Krueger and Schkade, 2008).11 It is important, however, to realise that test-retest 
correlation is not only substantially influenced by the lag between times of asking (for 
example one hour or two weeks), but also, and more fundamentally, by the specific 
measurement scale used. Studies show that the more advanced measures, such as multi-item 
questionnaires, produce more reliable SWB scores (see the overview in Krueger and 
Schkade, 2008). In addition, test-retest correlation is likely to be lower for indicators 
targeting the affective part o f SWB than for indicators aiming to measure the cognitive part. 
Thus, measures of happiness may be more susceptible to “whimsical” circumstances— the 
outcome of a soccer match and the weather, whether it is rainy or sunny, are famous 
examples (Schwarz and Strack, 1999: p. 62)—than measures of life satisfaction (Krueger and 
Schkade, 2008).
4.2 Validity
Validity comes in many sizes and shapes. In its regular use, validity denotes so-called 
‘construct validity’ (Larsen and Fredrickson, 1999: p. 44). A measure has construct validity if 
it is indeed able to capture the construct that it is intended to capture. Two important aspects 
that can contribute to an indicator’s overall construct validity are its convergent validity and 
its discriminant validity. Convergent validity refers to the correspondence between the 
indicator of interest and other indicators purporting to measure the same construct. If the 
measure of interest is to have convergent validity the results obtained should converge on the 
results obtained using these other measures; thus, convergent validity is high if  different 
measures of, say, positive affect give similar results. Discriminant validity considers how 
well the indicator correlates (or, usually, fails to correlate) with measures that measure 
something different.
The SWB literature pays a lot of attention to the validity of its measures (see note 9). 
The conclusion of the reviews is that measures of SWB do quite well on the various 
dimensions of validity mentioned above. Table 1 below presents a brief overview of some 
commonly cited evidence on the validity of measures of SWB.
11 The reliability of SWB indicators appears to be similar to that of other subjective measures 
such as self-reported health (see, for example, Crossley and Kennedy, 2002; Stewart et al., 
1988; VanderZee et al., 1996).
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Table 1: Validity of SWB measures
Study Main findings
Andrews and 
Crandall (1976)
Different single-item measures o f SWB give similar results, and o f the 
total variance in single items about 64% is ‘valid variance’.12 Validity can 
be increased further using composite multi-item indicators; a five-item 
scale would typically have about 80% valid variance.
Costa and 
McCrae (1988)
Self-reported SWB scores show convergence with reports filed by 
spouses.
Diener et al. 
(1991)
Self-reported levels of SWB converge on those reported by others (e.g. by 
family and friends).
Ekman et al. 
(1990)
Subjective reports on the experience o f positive emotions during an 
experiment correlated with the number o f genuine smiles (referred to as 
‘Duchenne’ smiles) that occurred during the experiment.
Kammann et al. 
(1984)
Factor analysis is used to show that thirteen different scales of SWB 
measure the same general well-being factor. In addition, the negative 
halves o f these scales measure the same construct as scales of neuroticism, 
depression and so-called trait anxiety.
Larsen et al. 
(1985)
Validity of various SWB measures is considered. Strong negative relations 
are found between positive overall SWB on the one hand and neuroticism 
and self-reported symptoms on the other. Strong positive correlations are 
found between overall SWB and ratings for several life domains, such as 
friendship, love life and financial situation.
Pavot and 
Diener (1993b)
Self-reported SWB correlates highly with peer reports, the personality 
traits of extraversion and neuroticism but not with current mood. Context 
has a slight effect on reported scores when single-item measures are used 
but multiple-item scales appear largely immune.
12 The valid variance is caused by the difference in SWB as actually perceived by the 
different respondents. Other variance results from measurement error, for instance, from 
respondents entertaining a different interpretation of the response categories (being ‘very 
happy’ does not mean the same thing to everybody) (cf. Andrews, 1984: p. 413).
14
Table 1, continued.
Study Main findings
Rodgers et al. 
(1988)
SWB measures are evaluated by comparing scores obtained using different 
measures. More than 50% of total variance is found to be valid variance 
and directly related to the construct of interest, while only 10% is 
attributable to method (and one third is due to measurement error in the 
specific measure used).
Seidlitz and 
D iener(1993)
For people with higher SWB scores, memories o f happy events are more 
accessible than for people with lower SWB, while current mood has only a 
modest effect on the availability of memories.
W atson and 
Clark (1991)
There is a strong correlation between self-reported scores on eight 
different negative affect and positive affect scales and ratings by peers.
Further confirmation of the validity of SWB measures comes from the large literature that has 
related SWB to a wide range o f other variables. Researchers have found that numerous 
factors, both objective and subjective, correlate highly significantly with SWB (for recent 
surveys o f the evidence see Argyle, 1999, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006, Diener and Suh, 
1999, Diener et al., 1999, Easterlin, 2003, Frey and Stutzer, 2002, Layard, 2005, 
Lyubomirsky et al., 2005 and Nettle, 2005). Factors include individual circumstances such as 
health, personal income, employment status and social relations, but there are links with 
societal features too. Notably, cross-country evidence finds that such factors as political 
freedom, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, environmental quality et cetera all 
correlate with average SWB reported by citizens from different countries. These findings, and 
many more like them, provide further evidence that measures of SWB appear to capture 
something important. That is, SWB matters.
The apparent pervasiveness of research validating measures of SWB notwithstanding, 
some important critical remarks have also been made. Whimsical circumstances like the 
outcome of a soccer match influence the level o f SWB people report (Schwarz and Strack, 
1999: p. 62). Such effects obviously are an important weakness o f SWB measures and, in 
fact, other survey data (cf. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). The errors generally seem to be 
of a random rather than a structural nature, however, working both to increase and decrease 
SWB scores. Consequently, the measuring instrument is unlikely to be systematically biased. 
Indeed, using large enough samples would go a long way in addressing possible problems
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introduced by contextual factors influencing the reported level of SW B.13 And this is the 
advantage o f using ESM, EMA or DRM: using repeated measures of SWB for a single 
individual lessens the influence of minor life events.
Another challenge SWB indicators face concerns their validity in cross-national 
comparisons. Here the issue is the possible impact of culture and language on SWB ratings 
(see Diener and Suh, 2000: pp. 5-9 for a short introduction to these issues; see also 
Wierzbicka, 2004). By the very nature of SWB and the way it is measured, i.e. through 
questionnaires, cultural and linguistic factors can affect SWB ratings. As W ierzbicka (1999: 
p. 31) puts it, ‘feelings represent the subjective experience of biological (physiological) 
events, but they can be categorized in a variety of ways, and they are categorized differently 
in different cultures’. SWB may thus be susceptible to influences that differ systematically 
over countries, meaning that measured levels of SWB can be structurally biased.
Evidence on this issue is not overwhelming, however. Language generally does not 
seem to pose much of a problem. Some tentative evidence comes from Inglehart (1990, pp. 
28-29). He looks at average levels of self-reported life satisfaction for German-speaking, 
French-speaking and Italian-speaking Swiss respectively, and finds that for all Swiss average 
scores are higher than the scores of their linguistic counterparts, people from Germany, 
France and Italy respectively. More convincingly, Ouweneel and Veenhoven (1991) compare 
self-reports across language groups in bilingual nations and do not find a reliable language 
effect. In addition, they find that the percentage of ‘don’t know’ answers to SWB questions 
(ignorance) does not differ much between countries.
Cultural characteristics would appear to be a more important factor and possible 
source of bias. Uchida et al. (2004) review the available cross-cultural evidence on SWB and 
find cultural dissimilarities, notably in the predictors of SWB. More concretely, Scollon et al. 
(2004) examine three different types o f global self-reports o f pleasant/unpleasant emotions 
for people from five groups with different cultural backgrounds and find that for all measures 
culture is a source of response differences between the groups. Vitters0 et al. (2005) find a
13 Boulding (1972: p. 466) describes this effect of the law of large numbers as follows: ‘Even 
if we cannot get very reliable measures for the individual, by the famous principle which I 
have sometimes called “Katona’s Law”, that the summation of ignorance produces 
knowledge, we may find an operation or instrument with self-cancelling random factors 
which will give us a much better measure for a hundred or a thousand individuals than we 
can get for one. ’
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similar result in their analysis of life satisfaction data from Norway and Greenland. Overall, 
no clear picture emerges, however, because, for example, Diener et al. (1995) discard a 
cultural explanation for particular observed differences in SWB (even with income controlled 
for). Specifically, humility and social desirability (where people give the answers they think 
others will regard favourably) do not affect reported SWB scores, leaving SWB differences 
between Pacific Rim countries and the U.S. unexplained. In addition, observed differences do 
not appear to be driven by ignorance, general lack of interest or a bias towards neutral and 
conforming answers.
It should further be pointed out that the simple fact that culture is a determinant of 
SWB or that SWB is differentially structured in terms o f its predictors does not by itself mean 
that the measure is somehow biased. In contrast, the effect of culture may be genuine. Alesina 
et al. (2004), for example, report that SWB scores o f Europeans suffers more from income 
inequality than the SWB ratings of Americans (see also Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006: pp. 
39-43). Other studies find marked heterogeneity in the predictors of SWB across countries 
with individualistic cultures and those with more collectivist cultures (Suh et al., 1998; Oishi 
et al., 1999). In this sense, cultural and linguistic factors are clearly not a source o f bias in 
cross-country comparisons— a nuisance we may want to dispose of—but rather the role of 
these factors in reported SWB, by itself, is interesting and worthy of attention.
Related research has looked more directly at emotions that are either shared by, or 
unique to, different cultures. For instance, Ekman et al. (1987) find that there is cross-cultural 
agreement both on the type of emotions expressed in facial images (e.g. sadness or joy). 
Results from this line of research indicates that there are universal basic emotions, and 
despite some methodological critique (Ortony and Turner, 1990), it seems that ‘“human 
emotions” vary a great deal across languages and cultures’, but that ‘they also share a great 
deal’ (Wierzbicka, 1999: p. 34). This commonality o f emotions suggests, in turn, that SWB 
measures do have meaning across national, linguistic and cultural borders.14
14 Some culturally rooted ‘bias’ is unavoidable in many indicators even, for example, in the 
comparison of national income numbers. Despite a common definition, these statistics are 
influenced by habits and customs regarding what activity takes place through the market (cf. 
Frankel, 1953). As an illustration, take Rosen’s (1996: pp 734-5) observation that: ‘[i]n 
Sweden a large fraction of women take care of the children of women who work in the public 
sector to care for the parents of the women who are looking after their children.’
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4.3 More on the meaning of SWB
The findings from the SWB literature presented above support the conclusion that SWB 
measures are meaningful. But there is less evidence about the meaning of these measures, 
other than that they are capturing something important. SWB remains largely an abstract 
concept. Two additional lines of research tackle this issue.
First, there is a substantial body of research that relates SWB to human physiology 
and brain activity.15 This work tells us that SWB is not merely a construct that exists within 
people’s minds. Rather, variations in SWB manifest themselves in observable biophysical 
phenomena as well as in people’s self-reports. One can judge indicators of SWB meaningful 
because, for instance, they correlate with objective variables that have a solid biological 
foundation.
The second line of research goes beyond simple correlates of SWB, and looks at the 
causal links between levels of SWB and other outcomes. The current level of reported SWB 
is found to have substantial predictive power for some important aspects of well-being. For 
instance, Cohen et al. (1995) report that the level o f SWB of healthy people measured before 
experimentally inducing an illness through exposure to a respiratory virus predicted
15 Levesque et al. (2003), for example, applied functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to analyse the neuroanatomical correlates of sad feelings in healthy children. 
Measured brain activity showed sad feelings are associated with significant bilateral 
activations of the midbrain, the medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior temporal pole and the 
right ventrolateral prefrontal. Ryff et al. (2004) present some preliminary findings showing 
that people with higher SWB (specifically more meaning, purposeful engagement et cetera in 
their lives) have lower levels of daily salivary cortisol and pro-inflammatory cytokines. In 
addition, for them the duration of REM sleep is longer than for those with lower levels of 
reported SWB. Urry et al. (2004) administered SWB questionnaires to people prior to 
analysing their brain activity. A higher level of reported SWB was associated with greater left 
than right superior frontal activation. Steptoe et al. (2005) report that positive affect is 
associated with reduced neuroendocrine, inflammatory and cardiovascular activity. Positive 
affect was also inversely related to cortisol output during the day (controlling for other factors 
such as age and gender) and heart rate. During mental stress testing in the laboratory people 
with higher positive affect had smaller plasma fibrinogen stress responses. Finally, a study by 
Rainville et al. (2006) shows that basic emotions are associated with distinctive patterns of 
cardio-respiratory activity.
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subsequent complaints. In particular, higher scores on negative affect were associated with 
higher disease severity and the number of health complaints like a runny nose, congestion 
and sneezing. Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. (2000) find that being dissatisfied with life predicts 
higher mortality and is indicative of general health risk. In addition, low satisfaction is 
associated with a higher risk of suicide (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al., 2001). Danner et al.’s
(2001) study o f autobiographies of 180 Catholic nuns written at age 22 shows that positive 
emotional content has a strong positive relation with longevity six decades later. Finally, 
Veenhoven (2008) presents evidence that higher SWB predicts longevity in healthy 
populations but not in sick populations, suggesting that SWB protects against becoming ill.
Reviewing a large part of the literature, Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) establish many 
domains of life in which high SWB appears to foster good outcomes (see also Veenhoven, 
1988 for earlier work evaluating the benefits o f high levels o f SWB). The time-series 
evidence, for instance, shows that people with higher SWB:
• go on to have higher income and better supervisory evaluations, and are less likely to 
suffer unemployment;
• are more likely to get married (happily) and more likely to remarry after divorce;
• have better mortality, less suicide, lower general health risk, and have a better chance of 
surviving conditions such as coronary heart disease;
• will be more social as shown by time spent doing volunteer work three years later;
• are judged as more creative by others later on; and
• drink less alcohol five years later (and smoke less now).
Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) also survey experimental studies and they confirm that 
positive affect and positive emotions that have been experimentally induced can cause good 
outcomes. The experiments by and large find that these feelings promote, amongst others, 
self-perception, sociability, conflict resolution and altruism, and this again points to a role for 
SWB as a causal factor in many positive outcomes.
4.4 Discussion
The evidence presented in this section suggests that many measures of SWB are meaningful 
and capture important information. As Diener and Suh (1999: p. 438) conclude, SWB 
indicators ‘... have a degree o f validity and are often not as contaminated as popular lore 
might s u g g e s t . ’. They are not without their frailties but some of the weaknesses a self­
measured construct like SWB is prone to have can be overcome.
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The field started with a simple question asking people to evaluate their life by putting 
a label on it. More complicated survey methodologies and multi-item scales have been 
developed and appear to have improved the measurement of SWB. Although much remains 
to be discovered, it seems likely that more progress will be made and one can envision a 
growing connection between the SWB construct on the one hand and objective biological 
phenomena such as patterns of brain activity on the other. Such a development would 
actually fit the growing trend of merging social sciences with cognitive and brain sciences; 
for instance, a new field in economics, called neuroeconomics, uses insights and methods 
from neuroscience to study decision making and hence improve economic theory (Camerer et 
al., 2005). Although our current understanding of the neuroanatomical correlates of SWB and 
the mechanism underlying the observed relations between SWB and brain activity is sketchy, 
knowledge in this area is advancing at great speed. Ultimately, we might actually be able to 
‘calibrate’ SWB scores with a mixture of physiological phenomena giving it an objective 
anchor.16
However, all these possibilities have strengths and weaknesses. SWB measured with a 
simple single-item scale may prove to be more than adequate in terms of both reliability and 
validity for some purposes. For others one might want more advanced measures of SWB and 
more than one scale may be used to allow for cross-referencing of the findings (cf. Larsen 
and Frederickson, 1999). Overall, no ‘gold standard’ exists (Larsen and Frederickson, 1999: 
p. 56) and each research project should start with a careful deliberation to ascertain the most 
suitable measuring instrument.
5. PUBLIC POLICY USES OF SWB
Developments in SWB research—rapidly increasing understanding of the correlates and 
determinants of SWB and continuous improvement o f the measures used— have sparked a
16 As a very crude illustration of what might actually be possible at some point, take a scale 
running from 1, dissatisfied to 10, satisfied (see Section 3). People from country X  reporting 
a 9 on this scale may have an average ‘brain activity level’ o f 100 while the average ‘brain 
activity level’ of people from country Y  with the same score (9) is 110. Vice versa, people 
with a ‘brain activity level’ o f 100 in country X  on average report a 9 on the dissatisfied- 
satisfied scale while in country Y  people with this ‘brain activity level’ (100) on average 
report an 8 on the same scale.
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small literature discussing and exploring possible uses of SWB in policy making (e.g. Diener 
and Suh, 1997; Diener et al., 2008; Dolan and White, 2007; Layard, 2005; Veenhoven, 2002). 
To some extent, suggested policy uses follow quite naturally from the conclusion that 
measures of SWB contain meaningful information. If  SWB matters, perhaps because it 
predicts longevity (Danner et al., 2001), appears to foster good outcomes in several areas of 
life (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005) or because it correlates with levels o f hypertension across 
countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008), it does not require a strong leap of faith to view 
promoting SWB as a legitimate policy aim .17
SWB can be usefully applied in public policy making also without it being an explicit 
goal (cf. Dolan and White, 2007). Because SWB matters—higher levels of SWB are 
generally preferred over lower levels of SWB— it has the possibility to give policy makers 
relevant information about the effects of their policies. Governments can assess their policies 
or base their decisions between alternative courses of action on the (expected) effect of their 
actions on the level of SWB. Prominent manifestations of this type of policy use of SWB are 
proposals for national indexes of SWB (Diener, 2000; Diener and Seligman, 2004; 
Kahneman et al., 2004a), which all aim to provide governments with relevant information not 
captured or not fully captured by existing (objective) statistics. On top of this, in the field 
several less obvious policy applications o f SWB have been developed. Notably, measuring 
SWB can help shed light on some hidden costs such as those of environmental externalities 
and terrorism or help tackle some of the problems associated with the measurement of 
poverty (relative vs. absolute) and household equivalence scales.
Below these different policy uses— SWB as a policy goal, SWB as a complement to 
existing measures o f well-being, SWB as a measuring rod in cost-benefit analyses and the use 
o f SWB in the construction of poverty statistics and equivalence scales— are discussed one 
by one. There is no strict line dividing all possible applications o f SWB in the making of 
public policy, but this taxonomy brings at least some order to the diverse policy uses SWB 
can and might have.18
17 Famously, Bhutan has declared “gross national happiness” as its overarching policy goal. 
In this use, happiness appears to be more about the philosophical concept and not so much 
about the SWB construct, however.
18 This overview is limited to application of measures of SWB and SWB research in public 
policy, which is often rather abstract. Many psychologists and psychiatrists are applying 
SWB research everyday and the same holds for many people working in medicine.
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5.1 SWB as a policy goal
5.1.1 Improving SWB: Why and how?
To have well-being as a policy goal is hardly controversial. Shoving aside the debate of what 
constitutes well-being, well-being itself is good—if it were not intrinsically good, it probably 
would not be called well-being. To have promoting SWB as an aim for public policy is much 
less tautological. The basic argument in favour of SWB as a policy goal is that it captures 
something that, again, is intrinsically good. Who would not like to experience frequent 
positive emotions, a minimal amount of negative emotions, and/or lead a meaningful life? 
Ceteris paribus most people very likely would indeed prefer a life filled with positive affect 
over a life filled with negative affect (cf. King and Napa, 1998; Diener et al., 1998; Diener 
and Oishi, 2004).19
In real life, the situation is a bit more complicated, however. Firstly, there is 
widespread scepticism concerning the extent to which measures of SWB indeed capture 
something meaningful like desirable mental states. Even when we accept that certain mental 
states are preferred over others, some doubt that measures of SWB are able to tell us anything 
about these states. In first instance, such scepticism would appear to require further 
assessment of the validity and reliability of measures of SWB, in particular delving more 
deeply in SW B’s biophysical and neuroanatomical correlates. Increasingly, however, SWB as 
a policy goal is defended on the grounds that even current indicators with their drawbacks are 
able to predict good outcomes. In this view, policies aiming to increase SWB make sense 
because they can help promote longevity, health et cetera.
Secondly, an important complicating factor is the simple practicality of how to go 
about increasing levels of SWB. At a general level, there are many factors associated with 
SWB on which governments can exert at least some influence. It goes to far to discuss all 
factors that might contribute to SWB or at least facilitate the achievement o f higher levels, 
but democracy, freedom and quality of governance are all positively related to average levels 
o f SWB (e.g. Veenhoven, 2008). These concepts are rather abstract, however, and somewhat
Developments point towards increased adoption of this research in other fields as well, 
notably that of public policy making.
19 The ceteris paribus clause deserves emphasis as the suggestion here is not that SWB is all 
that matters (cf. Diener et al., 1998).
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detached from concrete courses o f action governments can possibly take to foster SWB. The 
obvious example of a concrete policy is to increase expenditure on mental health care, which 
is logically expected to have high SWB pay-offs (though, of course, it detracts from other 
possible causes; see below). W ithin the realm of concrete government policies, the mostly 
hotly debated policy instrument in the SWB literature is that of taxation. Because it is so 
hotly debated, it serves as a useful case study to see how understanding o f SWB and its 
determinants can help formulate policies, in particular those aimed at fostering SWB.
5.1.2 Taxation and SWB: A  case study
In economics, the welfare consequences o f government policies, and taxes in particular, are 
typically assessed by looking at how they affect people’s choices—the so-called behaviourist 
approach. Indeed, many large macroeconomic models contain a small set o f core behavioural 
equations on which analyses of the costs and benefits of policy alternatives are based. SWB 
data and research can add a valuable perspective to this standard behaviourist approach to the 
study o f the welfare effects of a policy (cf. Holländer, 2001; Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005), 
not least where it concerns the welfare effects o f taxation.
The interest o f SWB researchers in how taxes might be used to promote SWB seems 
largely driven by one o f the most striking and robust results in the literature on the 
determinants of SWB. Empirical analyses consistently show that not only the absolute level 
o f income matters but that relative income, i.e. how one’s income compares with that of 
others, is also an important determinant o f SWB (e.g. Easterlin, 1974; Diener et al., 1993; 
Clark and Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001; see Clark et al., 2008 for an overview). Simply put, 
SWB does not generally increase as everybody’s income increases (cf. Easterlin 1995), and, 
what is more, income (or consumption) is associated with significant negative externalities. 
As Luttmer (2005) finds, SWB is negatively affected by the level of income of one’s 
neighbours, even to the extent that a given-sized increase of a neighbour’s income has the 
same negative effect on one’s SWB as a similarly-sized decrease in one’s own income.
Results like these on the importance of relative income and negative (consumption) 
externalities bring important new insight to the reigning understanding of the welfare 
consequences of taxation. In particular, authors like Layard (2005), following his earlier work 
on this issue (Layard, 1980), take the evidence on the effect of relative income on SWB to 
argue that (increased) taxation o f labour income can increase welfare— whereas the common 
wisdom dictates that such taxation leads to deadweight losses and thereby lowers welfare.
23
Theoretically, the idea is that because there is an externality—much like pollution, this tax 
will enhance efficiency by making the polluting activity, i.e. working for an income, less 
attractive in favour o f the non-polluting activity, which is to enjoy leisure. Rather than 
introduce distortions and deadweight losses, this tax will improve welfare, at least when one 
analyses its welfare consequences in terms of SWB.
The argument on how (carefully designed) taxes may be used to increase levels of 
SWB is the most clearly articulated policy suggestion arising from SWB research. But it is 
not something that originates strictly form SWB research. Before the use o f SWB indicators 
to measure welfare became widespread, a large theoretical literature already scrutinised the 
policy implications of a utility function with relative income effects; what does it mean for 
optimal taxation and policies aiming to maximize welfare if  people care not just about 
absolute but about relative income or consumption too? Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), for 
instance, find that the optimal level of income guarantees and marginal tax rates increases as 
relative consumption becomes more important in people’s utility function. Similarly, Ng 
(1987) analyses the implications of relative income effects on the optimal level of public 
goods provision. Although this level need not be too low when relative income is included in 
the utility function, the value of public expenditures is likely underestimated as people do not 
take into account its benefits that are received indirectly through the lowering of private 
expenditures and the limiting of relative income effects.
Going beyond taxes as an SWB-promoting policy instrument, there is an important 
general lesson to be learned from the above discussion of taxation and its possible role in 
improving SWB. O f course, SWB research is very important in guiding policy makers that 
aim to improve levels of SWB. At the same time, the value of this research is not limited to 
suggesting how a concrete policy measure (such as a tax) may be used to enhance SWB 
scores. More indirectly, it can also add an important perspective to existing analyses and 
established wisdom. By showing that relative income indeed matters, SWB research has 
shown, for example, that theoretical analyses like those of Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and 
Ng (1987) can be relevant in real-life policy situations. In this sense, SWB research can help 
uncover areas in which certain policies, theoretically thought to be able to affect welfare, may 
indeed contribute to well-being in ways not previously thought realistic or feasible.
5.2 Towards a more comprehensive account of well-being
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SWB indicators are often put forward as useful complements to existing measures of how 
well life is going. Underlying this observation is the growing recognition that, though 
insightful, there likely is more to well-being than objective measures— alone or in 
combination— are able to capture.
A prominent example of an area in which objective indicators go only so far in giving 
relevant and meaningful information is the issue of trust. W hether people think they can trust 
their fellowman or -woman, or whether they expect to be ‘stabbed in the back’ at every 
possible occasion certainly is an important feature of any society. In addition, it is not clear 
whether objective indicators can give an accurate and meaningful account of the level of trust 
in a country. For instance, the number o f fraud cases brought before a court per capita per 
year might tell us something about trust, but few would argue that this number captures the 
essence of the concept. W hat is more, a subjective indicator, cleverly asking people how 
much they trust others, will very likely add insight to existing objective statistics on this 
aspect of a society.
Concerning well-being, the central tenet of SWB research is that the study of well­
being cannot get around measuring people’s cognitive and affective reactions to life as whole 
or specific domains thereof (Diener and Suh, 1997: p. 200; see also Diener et al., 2008 and 
Veenhoven, 2002). Most significantly, the argument is that SWB is able to capture’s people 
actual experience in a direct manner, while economic, social and environmental indicators do 
so only indirectly (Diener and Suh, 1997: p. 205). This matters because what is experienced 
does not have to coincide with objective conditions, and indeed a large deviation can often be 
observed. Crime rates can be low (relatively speaking) but at the same time people might be 
afraid to wander through the streets alone at night; or people may be well-educated, but 
nonetheless feel they just do not understand the world in which they live. In fact, it is often 
argued SWB indicators are useful complements to objective indicators precisely because 
there is a divergence between what people (reportedly) experience and with what is captured 
in the (existing) objective indicators (see, in particular, Diener and Seligman, 2004: pp. 2-3). 
That is, such divergence is an obvious requirement for SWB to contribute to a more 
comprehensive picture of well-being— if it correlated perfectly with objective indicators, it 
would not add anything.
Following the above reasoning, and building on the methods for measuring SWB 
discussed in Section 3, researchers in the field have given the idea of national SWB statistics 
serious consideration. To give but one example, Diener (2000: p. 40) proposes to apply
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Experience Sampling to a nationally representative sample of respondents (see also Diener 
and Seligman, 2004; Kahneman et al., 2004a). SWB would be recorded for a cross-section 
comprising different age groups, geographical regions, occupational categories and income 
levels. To maximise the usefulness, reliability and validity o f SWB thus measured, the actual 
survey items would target all components of SWB, the affective component (the presence of 
positive affect and the absence of negative affect) and the cognitive component, and could 
use for instance a PANAS scale. In addition, other constructs deemed to capture important 
aspects of the quality of life and not captured in objective measured could be included, for 
instance stress and trust.
At a conceptual level, a generally accepted set of guidelines for the construction of 
national SWB statistics is available (Diener, 2006). At a practical level, there is also 
agreement about the method for collecting the self-reports, ESM or DRM, quite possibly in 
some combination, seems the most suitable way to organise the effort (Diener, 2006: p. 402). 
How subsequently best to carry out the actual collection o f the data is still an open issue, 
however. Thousands of people completing ten randomly timed questionnaires on their 
palmtop each day complemented with frequent blood pressure and other physiological tests 
may be the most rigorous approach, but does not seem feasible. In particular, it would be 
prohibitively expensive, and getting a representative sample to subject to this testing for a 
considerable amount of time (say a year) would probably be next to impossible. Hence, in the 
construction of a national index of SWB there is an important trade off between rigor and 
feasibility, and how best to deal with this issue is an important challenge for SWB-based 
complements to existing measures of well-being and aspects thereof.
5.3 Subjective well-being as a measuring rod
An essential aspect in formulating policy is to assess the costs and benefits of alternative 
courses of action (including doing nothing). Though straightforward in principle, 
practicalities often limit the usefulness and applicability of formal cost-benefit analyses 
where policy alternatives are compared in terms of a single monetary metric. In many policy 
areas, public goods and externalities being the ones most familiar to economists, there is just 
no way of putting a price tag on the relevant dimensions of the different options available. In
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some cases, however, SWB can provide a way to circumvent the problem of missing prices.20 
The effects of public goods, externalities, policy actions or, in fact, any other valuation 
problem a government wants to address, are evaluated in terms of their contribution— 
negative or positive—to SWB. Valuation exercises that use SWB generally take two steps: 
first the valuation problem is reduced to its contribution to SWB, and second this contribution 
is compared with the role income plays in SWB.21 Specifically, the second step consists of 
calculating by how much the level of income would have to change to offset exactly the 
SWB-effect of the public good, the externality or the policy alternative. The four case studies 
discussed below all take this approach, in which money remains the ultimate ‘measuring rod’ 
(cf. Pigou, 1952) but where the use of SWB indicators helps extend the range o f valuation 
problems the government is able to address by formal cost-benefit analysis.
The first example is van Praag and Baarsma’s (2005) study o f the costs of noise 
nuisance around Amsterdam Schiphol airport. They combine a traditional approach to 
valuing the noise nuisance from the airport with the use of SWB data. Ordinarily, a hedonic 
regression analysis of house prices is used to calculate the shadow costs of noise nuisance. 
The hedonic approach to valuing such an intangible is prone to leave some residual costs, 
however, and these can be valued using SWB ratings. The method thus developed is 
particularly useful when for some reason, notably market imperfections, price differences do 
not fully capture the costs or benefits o f an externality.
W elsch (2006) uses SWB data to circumvent the problem of missing prices in 
environmental valuation. Specifically, he uses panel data on ten European countries to 
analyse the effect of air pollution on SWB. Controlling for income, he finds that differences 
in SWB, both between countries and within countries over time can partially be attributed to 
environmental quality. The improvement in air quality over the period 1990-1997 is valued at 
roughly $750 per capita per year in the case of nitrogen dioxide and about $1400 per capita 
per year in the case of lead (averaged over all countries).
Relying on SWB data, Frey et al. (2007) are able to expand the dimensions o f life to 
which valuation techniques have been applied and assess the costs of terrorism. The case
20 Better known, contingent valuation provides a further approach to solving the problem of 
missing prices (see the symposium in the Fall 1994 edition of the Journal o f Economic 
Perspectives for a thorough introduction).
21 See Kahneman and Sugden (2005) for a discussion of SWB as the direct unit of value in 
comparing policy alternatives.
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concerns the Republic of Ireland, during the period 1970-1999. The study uses data from the 
Eurobarometer survey and in the analysis differences in reported life satisfaction are 
explained from levels of terrorism, household income and other personal characteristics. 
Their findings reveal that people, on average, would be willing to give up some 41% of their 
income to have the level of terrorism reduced to the level prevailing in more peaceful parts of 
the country.
Finally, Oswald and Powdthavee (2007) propose a method of using SWB data to 
calculate compensatory claims in tort cases, notably bereavement. The idea is that the 
emotional damage the perpetrator inflicted on the victim will be exactly offset by the positive 
well-being effect o f a monetary settlement.22 A typical amount for such hedonic 
compensation is calculated at £100,000 or roughly $200,000.
5.4 Poverty measures and household equivalence scales
Though much discussed, poverty is actually quite difficult to measure and many different 
approaches exist (cf. Citro and Michael, 1995; see also Foster, 1998). Particularly challenging 
is that poverty appears to have an important relative component. Notably Adam Smith (1776: 
p. 1103) already observed that:
A  linen shirt, fo r  example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary o f  life. The Greeks and  
Romans lived, I  suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the 
present times, through the greater part o f  Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be 
ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want o f  which would be 
supposed to denote that disgraceful degree o f  poverty which, it is presumed, nobody 
can well fa ll  into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has 
rendered leather shoes a necessary o f  life in England. The poorest creditable person, 
o f  either sex, would be ashamed to appear in public without them.
The relative elements of poverty can be taken into account with SWB data in an approach 
pioneered over 30 years ago by Bernard van Praag and subsequent collaborators (see van 
Praag and Frijters, 1999 for an overview). For his approach, van Praag used the subjective, 
survey-based approach to measure what is referred to as the ‘utility o f income’ (van Praag
22 The corresponding legal principle is called ‘restitutio in integrum’, which literally means 
‘restoration to original condition’ (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2007: p. 1).
28
and Frijters, 1999: p. 417). Many variations are possible, but at the basic level he asked (p. 
418):
While keeping prices constant, what after-tax total monthly income would you  
consider fo r  your fam ily to be:
Very bad $
Bad $
Insufficient $
Sufficient $
Good $
Very good $
This is the so-called ‘Income Evaluation Question’ or ‘IEQ ’. Use and analysis o f the IEQ has 
produced two main findings. First, the utility function of income is found to differ over 
people. Second, subsequent testing showed that the observed differences are related to 
objectively observable characteristics of respondents. In particular, income actually earned is 
a very significant factor in the utility function of income. Simply put, a person earning 
$40,000 typically thinks $100,000 is a very good income, while a person actually earning 
$100,000 thinks $200,000 would qualify as a very good income; and the opposite holds as 
well, someone with a $40,000 income usually thinks a $20,000 income is worse than does a 
person actually earning $20,000 (van Praag and Frijters, 1999: p. 423).
A government, or in fact, anybody who might be interested in defining poverty in a 
(partially) relative way can follow the approach captured in the IEQ. The poverty line could 
be drawn at the average income deemed very bad by the median household, for instance, but 
countless definitions are imaginable. The interesting and very useful feature of such a 
definition is that no (frequent) redefinition is needed and that the relative aspects of poverty 
are automatically accounted for. W hat is considered a very bad income evolves with the 
development of average earnings of, say, the median household. Changes therein— increases 
in times of economic growth and decreases during economic downturns— are directly 
reflected in the poverty line, and ultimately the poverty statistics.
Uses of the IEQ in public policy do not stop at measures of (relative) poverty, but 
straightforwardly extend to the construction of household cost functions and/or equivalence
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scales (see van Praag and van der Sar, 1988). How the needs of households change with their 
size, i.e. the number of household members, is a long-standing question in economics and an 
important policy issue. The idea is that the total costs of needs increase with each additional 
member, but not in a proportional way; there are economies of scale so that the need for 
housing space, electricity, et cetera will not be twice as high for a two-person household as it 
is for a single-person household. In terms of the IEQ, besides income, household size is a 
second important factor in observed utility functions of income. Keeping other personal 
circumstances constant, larger households are less satisfied with any given level of income. 
Knowing the size of the dissatisfaction for households of different sizes subsequently gives 
an idea of the extent to which households’ needs increase with their size, aiding the 
construction of suitable equivalence scales.
6. SUMMARIZING REMARKS
Happiness, pleasure, joy, the good life and related notions have been and continue to be the 
subject of much debate. Starting in the second half of the 20th century, this long-standing 
debate has received an important impetus. At that point, psychologists, traditionally 
concerned with negative emotions and feelings, slowly became interested in positive aspects 
of life, for instance in people feeling happy rather than miserable or being satisfied with their 
life rather than dissatisfied. This research programme was highly empirical and developed 
new indicators to measure how well individuals themselves feel their life is going. The 
general construct that came out of their efforts is best referred to as subjective well-being 
(SWB). SWB, in turn, refers to a broad set of phenomena that includes positive emotion, 
engagement, satisfaction and meaning. The key feature o f measures of SWB is that they rely 
entirely on inherently subjective self-appraisals and make no referral to objective 
circumstances.
SWB is a survey-based measure obtained by simply asking people to answer certain 
questions, and therefore is susceptible to the problems survey data can typically have. Indeed, 
a common finding is that contextual factors, ranging from the order o f questions to weather 
conditions, affect reported SWB levels. On these and other grounds, the validity and 
reliability of indicators of SWB, or more general their ability to convey information that is 
meaningful, is much challenged. For SWB this appears to hold even more than for most other 
variables measured through the use of questionnaires. After all, it is not evident what one is
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measuring when asking somebody ‘taking all things together, would you say you are’ and 
then giving four response categories to choose from (‘very happy, quite happy, not very 
happy or not at all happy’). At the core, this question simply asks people to put a label on 
their life. There is no rationale for asking this question with these specific response categories 
other than the expectation that the resulting measure will be meaningful. This is an 
outstanding feature of the concept of SWB: it appears largely conceptualised through the 
specific indicators used to measure it, i.e. by the specific questions asked.
Considering all this, it might be surprising to find that measures of SWB are actually 
quite able to capture something important and useful. As the review in this paper shows, 
amidst all their weaknesses, indicators of SWB do provide important and useful information 
on how well people or a society as a whole are doing. Even if  the measured level of SWB 
indeed is just a simple label people put on their life when asked upon, it appears to matter for 
a broad class of phenomena. It correlates with many factors generally considered important 
for well-being, e.g. health, income and good relationships, and predicts good outcomes in 
many of these areas. In addition, it has biological correlates, notably SWB is associated with 
patterns of brain activity and blood pressure levels.
Interestingly, measurement in the field of SWB is advancing rapidly. Single-item 
scales do reasonably well in terms of reliability and validity but multi-item scales already 
lead to much improvement. Recently developed measurement techniques such as the 
Experience Sampling Method (ESM) or the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) hold great 
promise for leading to ever more meaningful measures. Though several of the problems with 
SWB measures— or subjective indicators in general— seem insoluble, it is clear the indicators 
can be improved upon. Already an interesting and meaningful indicator, reported levels of 
SWB will increasingly be able to give important insight on how well people and societies as a 
whole are doing.
W ith reliability and validity established, application o f SWB data and SWB research 
in policy making follows quite naturally. Many different applications seem possible but most 
prominently SWB, i.e. increasing its level, can itself be a policy goal, not least because high 
levels o f SWB appear to predict good outcomes such as longevity. Beyond the goal of 
improving SWB, indicators of SWB can be used more generally in formulating and 
evaluating policy. In particular, SWB data can give public policy makers relevant information 
about the costs and benefits of their policies and be used to assess the effects of alternative 
courses of action. An interesting application is the use of SWB indicators in the valuation of
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environmental externalities such as noise nuisance and air pollution. Although SWB is not 
widely applied in shaping and appraising policy, it is clear that policy makers may find 
measuring SWB useful. W hat is more, as SWB research advances, not least in terms of the 
methods by which the SWB construct is given empirical content, its usefulness for public 
policy making is set to improve further.
As with all societal indicators, important caveats apply to SWB indicators and their 
use in formulating public policy as well, and one o f these deserves explicit mentioning. SWB 
research or measures of SWB do not provide a policy recipe. Although we are unaware of 
any indicator for which changes, up, down or lack thereof, do come with straight-cut policy 
advice, this point is well emphasised. Thus the SWB literature may ultimately have an effect 
on what governments do or do not do, and how they do it, but the field itself only hands the 
tools and insights, not a roadmap.
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